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WOMEN, EMPLOYMENT, AND THE FAMILY IN NAIROBI: 
THE IMPACT OF CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT IN KENYA 
By Sharon Stichter 
The notion is widespread that economic development will lead, eventually, 
to a rise in the status of women. It is argued, for example, that in Western 
Europe the increased participation of women in the wage labor market led to the 
extension of more social and political rights to women, and to greater equality 
between men and women in family relations (Goode, 1964; Giele, 1977). On the 
other hand, a number of studies of Western European history have now shown 
that the presumed rise in women's status was by no means uniform or 
uninterrupted, and that it was experienced much more by middle-class than by 
working-class women, among whom traditional patterns of family decision-
making and division of labor persisted. In these families, wage earning for 
women was simply incorporated within patriarchal family traditions rather than 
changing them (Scott and Tilly, 1975). 
On the periphery of the world economy today, multinational, national and 
state investment has been drawing women into wage labor. In areas favored by 
multinational investment such as southeast Asia and parts of Latin America, this 
process has been astonishingly rapid; in other areas, especially Africa, it has been 
slow. The growing body of literature on the family impacts of wage earning by 
Third World women today suggests that assertions of rising status must be 
qualified not only by class, but also by women's age and position in the family 
developmental cycle. Much research has been focused on young, single daughters, 
since this category of women is in highest demand by multinational corporations 
and is also least subject to family pressures operating against labor force 
participation - that is, the pressure to bear and rear children. For both these 
reasons, young, unmarried women are, in most parts of the world, the most likely 
to be employed. Studies of working daughters in Asia and Latin America have 
found that gains in status either within or outside the family are extremely 
limited. The women have been able to expand consumption levels and gain short-
term freedoms in social life, but most of their earnings are received and 
controlled by parents, and working daughters do not significantly expand their 
input into family decision-making processes. Nor does their low wage confer on 
them the power to transcend their dependence on the family. Most continue to 
marry, and to cease employment when child-bearing commences (Salaff, 1981; 
Kung, 1976; Safa, 1981; Fernandez-Kelly, 1983). On the other hand research results 
on the effects of married women's participation in the labor force are more 
mixed. Some studies report little or no effect on family decision-making (Aguiar, 
1975). Others suggest that the decision-making power of wives has increased, and 
that the companionate form of marriage is becoming more widespread (Wong, 
1976; Wong and Ko, 1984; Salaff and Wong, forthcoming; Salaff, 1985; Safa, 
forthcoming; Chaudhury, 1979). Most studies, however, find that the actual 
distribution of work within the household is unaffected, housework still being 
left almost wholly to the woman (Salaff and Wong, forthcoming; Wong, 1976). 
However Safa found that Puerto Rican men are now increasingly helping with 
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family chores (Safa, forthcoming). With regard to class differences, most studies 
either find little difference between women in white-collar and manual 
occupations, or do not address the question, since they are focussed solely on a 
single category of workers. 
The research reported here investigates these questions in the case of 
Kenya. It examines whether the entry of urban married women into white and 
blue-collar work has affected aspects of family structure and process, in 
particular family decision-making, apportionment of financial responsibility and 
division of household labor. The findings support the view that the family 
impacts of development vary markedly according to social class and income. 
Among middle-income urban families there is a trend toward "joint" family 
decision-making and resource pooling, but this trend is much less evident among 
lower-income families. There is little indication among either the middle-class or 
the manual wage-earning families of a move toward egalitarianism in family 
labor allocation - that is, of husbands' performing an increased amount of 
household work. 
Overall, Kenyan women have been drawn into wage labor only to a 
limited extent. Among formal-sector wage workers in 1979, only 16 percent were 
women (ILO, 1981). Foreign investment has largely gone into the agricultural 
sector in Kenya, and the majority of employed women are found in agriculture. 
Of all employees in manufacturing, only about 8 percent are women; this sector 
has provided very few opportunities for women, in contrast to other parts of the 
Third World. Expansion of the commercial, educational, and state bureaucratic 
sectors in recent years has, on the other hand, provided opportunities for women 
with secondary education. The modest increase in women's employment since the 
1960s has been almost solely in the service sector. Typists, for example, are about 
97 percent female, nurses and midwives 70 percent female, and teachers below 
the secondary level 61 percent female (Kenya, Statistical Abstract, 1975, Table 226). 
Forty percent of all female employees are accounted for by teaching, secretarial, 
clerical, and health workers. Most of the higher-level positions in the medical and 
educational sectors, and in clerical and sales generally, are still, however, held by 
men. Clerical work as a whole is only 12 percent female, sales work 14 percent, 
teachers 34 percent and medical occupations 44 percent (Feldman, 1981). Despite 
the sex-stereotyping of occupations, and the exclusion of women from higher-
level managerial and administrative positions, the gains in white-collar 
employment for women have been real. For employed women in Kenya the 
question can be raised, then, as to what effects gains in economic status have had 
on women's status generally, and particularly their status within the family. 
Two-Earner Couples in Nairobi 
The survey results presented here are based on a sample of families living 
in two fairly new housing estates on the edge of Nairobi, Burn Burn Phase 1, 
Burn Burn Phase 2, and Umoja. 1 The sample was a 10 percent systematic random 
1 
This research was funded by grants from the Social Science Research Council and the Ford 
Foundation Program for Women in East and Central Africa. As usual, these organizations bear no 
responsibility for the interpretations advanced here. 
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one in Buru Buru and a 5 percent systematic random one in Umoja, with total 
N= 317. The survey was carried out in July and August 1979. Both estates are very 
large; Buru Buru Phases 1 and 2 together have about 1,897 units; Umoja at the 
time of interviewing had 2,903 units. Both estates were built with external 
assistance (the former from the Commonwealth Development Corporation, the 
latter from U.S. AID), then sold to Africans who met the minimum income levels 
needed to qualify for the mortgage. Units are supposed to be owner-occupied, but 
estimates are that some 30-40 percent are rented out. The style of housing varies: 
Buru Buru is two-story wood frame construction with three to five room units 
and a private parking space, while Umoja is one-story concrete block 
construction with two-room units. The cost of the housing has varied accordingly, 
Umoja being much lower cost. Housing prices in Buru Buru have increased with 
each succeeding phase as construction costs have risen; those in Phase 2 were 
higher than in Phase 1, and those in the projected Phases 3 and 4 will be higher 
still. 
Our sample as a whole is fairly representative of upper working class, 
lower middle class, and upper middle class families in the city. The modal income 
varied by estate, from a high of 3000-3599 pounds per annum in Buru Buru 2, to 
1200-1799 pounds in Buru Buru 1, to 600-1199 pounds in Umoja (Table 1). The 
median income in Nairobi in 1979 was estimated to be about 1200-1300 pounds p.a., 
but this was for individuals; obviously the median total family income in the city 
would be somewhat higher. The median family income in our sample was 1740 
pounds. Most of those below this level live in Umoja, and most of those above it 
in Buru Buru 2. More and more high-income families are applying for houses in 
Buru Buru, couples who would really rather live elsewhere but are facing a 
shortage of housing for high-income Africans in the city. 
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White-collar workers predominate among the men and women in the 
sample (Table 2). Among the men, there is a good representation of skilled 
technical workers in all estates, and there are some manual workers in Umoja. 
Buru Buru 1 has a notable percentage of professional employees, while Buru 
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Buru 2 has a good number of managers and administrators. Too great a reliance 
cannot be placed upon these figures, however, because of a tendency among some 
respondents to overstate the level of their position, thus slightly inflating the 
numbers in the professional and managerial categories. Other researchers in this 
area have also mentioned this phenomenon (Menezies, 1978). The great majority 
of employed women were also in white collar jobs, most frequently as typists, 
secretaries, or clerks. A third of them were in professional-level jobs, almost all 
primary school teachers or nurses. Hardly any women held managerial positions. 
A small number were self-employed, the majority of these being in Umoja. In 
spite of the fact that the majority of wives in the sample were employed and 
contributed to household income in a major way (Table 3), it is noteworthy that 
legal ownership of the houses in Buru Bu~u seems to have remained almost 
wholly in male hands. This is partly because of bank restrictions on giving 
mortgages to women, but even though banks did allow 50 percent of the wife's 
earnings to be used to meet the income qualifications for the mortgage, very few 
of the men had to, or chose to, list their wife's earnings, presumably because this 
would mean that she would have to become joint owner of the house. 
Table 2 
OCCUPATION (Percentages) 
BB2 BBi Umoja Total 
Women 
Manual 8.1 1.7 3.8 4.7 
White Collar 51.6 63.2 75.0 62.5 
Professional 40.3 35.1 2U 32.7 
100.0 100.0 100.0 99.9 
Men 
Manual 2.9 2.9 14.2 7.9 
Technical 19.1 22.1 18.9 19.8 
White Collar 35.3 35.3 49.0 41.3 
Professional 17.6 25.0 13.2 17.8 
Managerial, Administrative 25.0 14.7 4.7 13.2 
99.9 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Table 3 
EMPLOYMENT STATUS - WOMEN (Percentages) 
BB2 BBl Umoja Total 
Employed Full Time 83.1 75.3 46.3 64.7 
In School or Training L3 1.3 3.3 2.2 
Unemployed, Looking for Work 5.2 6.5 18.2 11.3 
Unemployed, Not Looking or 
No Information 9.1 15.6 28.1 19.3 
(Total Unemployed) (14.3) (22.1) (46.3) 30.6) 
Self-Employed 1.3 1.3 4.1 2.5 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
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As to education, over half of both the men and the women in the sample 
had completed Form 4 secondary education. Among women, 60 percent had 
completed secondary school, while 85 percent of the men had (Table 4). Umoja 
does not differ so markedly from Bum Bum in male and female educational 
attainment as it does in median income; this is partly because Umoja residents 
are on the average ten years younger than those in Bum Bum, and either they 
have not yet reached their maximum earning capacity, or they are finding that 
education does not so easily translate into income as it did a decade earlier. Still, 
among the women, a greater percentage in Bum Bum 2 than in Bum Bum 1, and 
in Bum Bum 1 than in Umoja, had completed some post-secondary training (over 
Form 4), and a smaller proportion in Bum Bum 2 than in the other two areas had 










































































The three residential areas, Bum Bum 2, Bum Bum 1, and Umoja, are at 
different points along the dimensions of average family income, occupation, and 
whether or not the wife is employed, Bum Bum 2 being highest, Bum Bum 1 the 
next, and Umoja the lowest. (Education, as noted, presents a more complex 
picture.) The following sections compare domestic relations among married 
couples in the three estates, in order to indicate the relationships between 
income, women's employment, and women's status in the family. 
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Structure of the Domestic Unit 
The monogamous married couple with spouses co-resident - that is, the 
formal approximation of the Western "nuclear" family - is the predominant 
household form in this sample, the more so the higher the income level (Table 5). 
However, several factors, residential, marital, and social, serve to modify this 
structure, and distinguish contemporary urban African families from those 
elsewhere in the world. 
Table 5 
HOUSEHOLD COMPOSITION 
BB2 BBl Umoja Th!ru 
Single, separated, divorced, 
widowed, Female 12 7.3 8.0 6.0 
Single, separated, divorced, 
widowed, Male 1.2 0.0 0.7 0.7 
Married, One Wife, Both 
live there 84.0 78.0 69.3 75.7 
Married, One Wife, Wife 
lives elsewhere 0.0 6.1 14.6 8.3 
Married, One Wife, Husband 
lives elsewhere 7.4 3.7 3.0 4.3 
Married, Two or more wives 6.2 2.4 3.6 4.0 
Unmarried couple 0.0 2.4 0.7 1.0 
100.0 99.9 99.9 100.0 
Residentially, a good proportion of the wives still have their primary 
residence elsewhere, mainly in rural areas, in the pattern that has been so 
characteristic of Africa since the period of colonial migrant labor. This 
arrangement is more common in the lower-income estate. But also, a noticeable 
proportion of husbands live elsewhere, especially in the higher-income area. They 
are usually away studying or on business. 
Polygyny remains an ever-present possibility, even in urban African 
families. The rate of reported, formalized polygyny is low overall, 4 percent, but 
is highest in the higher-income estate. This finding suggests that polygyny may 
well not decline as income increases in Kenya, at least in the short run. It is, for 
example, impossible to assess the rate of "disguised polygyny," the practice 
whereby a man keeps a mistress or "outside wife" in a separate flat, often without 
the knowledge of his first wife. Rumor had it that many of the single women in 
Umoja, a number of whom had children, were in fact mistresses or "outside 
wives." 
The average number of live births per woman in Buru Buru 2 was 3.18, 
whereas in Buru Buru 1 it was 3.43, even though the age distribution of women in 
the 2 estates was similar. The difference between the two figures, and the low 
level generally, illustrate the impact of female education and employment on 
fertility. The mean number of children born per woman in Umoja was 2.42, 
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reflecting the younger age of the female population there. 2 The percentage of 
children living at home with their mother was about 90 percent. Modal household 
size was 7 in Buru Buru 2, 8 in Buru Buru 1, and 5 in Umoja, meaning that there 
were usually at least two other persons resident in addition to husband, wife and 
children. One of these was usually the maid, or "housegirl," who might be a 
relative. In addition, most families took in other relatives as temporary guests. 
Among these families, social and financial ties to extended kin remain strong. 
"Female-headed households" would seem to comprise the first and fifth 
categories in Table 5. All told, the percentage of such households was fairly high: 
10.3 percent overall, 8.6 percent in Buru Buru 2, 11 percent in Buru Buru 1, and 11 
percent in Umoja. However, in assessing women's economic position, the question 
is not simply the presence or absence of a man, but rather the degree of financial 
support from him. In this sense, the first category, of single, separated and 
widowed women is much more "at risk" than are wives whose husbands are 
temporarily living elsewhere. Most of these women could not continue to live at 
their present level without their jobs, given the vagaries of assistance from 
family and boyfriends. In Umoja almost all female-headed households (and 8 
percent of all households) were in this category. By contrast, in Buru Buru 2 
nearly all the female-headed households were married women whose husbands 
were temporarily away. Thus, the percentage of "at risk" female-headed 
households rises as income levels decrease. The analysis in this paper, however, 
focuses on the position of women within formal marital relationships, and so is 
based on the sub-sample of married households only. 
The great majority of women in this sample - 86 percent in Buru Buru 2, 
74 percent in Buru Buru 1, and 51 percent in Umoja - were contributing to their 
family income in a monetary way, rather than being simply dependent 
"housewives" or contributing only production in kind. Where they were not able 
to contribute, this was usually because of the high rate of unemployment among 
women, much higher than that among men. Women's unemployment rate was 30.6 
percent in the sample as a whole: 14.3 percent in Buru Buru 2, 22.1 percent in 
Buru Buru 1, and fully 46.3 percent in Umoja (Table 3). A third of those 
unemployed were still actively looking for work. Household structure had some 
effect on whether women were employed, in that in all estates all of the 
unmarried, divorced and widowed women interviewed were employed. Evidently 
they had to be in order to afford to live in the estates. But the developmental 
cycle of the family, reflected in the ages of the children, had virtually no effect 
on whether the wife was employed. Of all those employed, 77.7 percent had one 
or more children under six years of age, which was slightly more than the sample 
average of 70.4 percent of families with children of that age. This pattern of 
women's labor force participation distinguishes Africa from those parts of the 
Third World, for example Asia and Latin America, where women customarily 
drop out of the labor force upon the birth of children. 
Ethnicity was another factor related to women's employment. The female 
sample as a whole was 46.8 percent Kikuyu, Embu and Meru; 17.1 percent Luyia; 
15.7 percent Luo; 10.2 percent Kamba; and 10.2 percent other. The ethnic 
2 The fertility relationships in the sample will be dealt with in a later paper. 
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distribution for males was similar. Kikuyu, Embu and Meru women had the 
highest rate of employment (70.8 percent), followed by Kamba (63.3 percent), 
Luyia (56.0 percent), and Luo (41.3 percent). Given the 64 percent average rate of 
employment among women, Luo women were severely underemployed. Fifty-two 
percent of Luo women were unemployed, as contrasted to 24.8 percent among the 
Kikuyu, Embu and Meru. Whether this fact results from discrimination in the 
hiring markets, from differential educational qualifications or from a persistence 
of the traditionally strict controls over women among the Luo, is a matter 
needing further research. 
Compared to low-income areas of the city, and to the rural areas, the rates 
of employment for these largely middle class, educated women are high. Women 
with lower educational and skill levels have even greater difficulty in getting 
access to employment. Even in this sample, Umoja illustrates how urban women 
with some education can still become financially dependent on a husband when 
they cannot find work. 
Those women who are employed, however, contribute substantially to the 
family budget, often being solely responsible for major expenditures such as food 
and the wages of housegirls. Far from most African husbands being opposed to 
their wives' labor force participation, most seem to expect and value women's 
ability to generate income. Thus the fact of women's important domestic 
contribution, which was so important a feature of African traditional societies, 
persists today in the urban middle-class context. The question is, what difference 
does this fact make in women's decision-making power in the family? And, given 
the separation of housework from income-generating work inherent in capitalist 
industrial society, what happens to the allocation of housework? 
Division of Financial Responsibility 
The first dependent variable to be examined is the extent to which there 
is a separated or "autonomous" pattern of income disposal in urban families, as 
opposed to a "joint" pattern, and among autonomous patterns, whether they are 
wife-dominated or husband-dominated. Conceptually, it is important to 
distinguish between a woman's earnings and her control over those earnings. In 
some rural areas of Africa, wives may contribute greatly to household income, 
but it may be the husband who decides how the majority of that income is to be 
spent. Similarly, in Southeast Asia, working daughters may turn over all of their 
wages to the family, leaving the parents to decide on expenditures. In many ways, 
control over income may be a more important index of status than actual 
production of income. 
Our measure of control over income is derived from the wife's responses 
to the question "Between you and your husband, who usually pays for the 
following items? (Read list.) Would you say it was .... (read options for answers)." 3 
3 Husbands' responses to this same question, and to the questions about division of household labor and 
decision-making, were also collected. Differences in husbands' and wives' perceptions will be reported on in 
another paper. 
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The eight items were food, children's clothing, wife's clothing, husband's clothing, 
wages of housegirl, children's school fees, large furniture items, and rent or 
mortgage. It is assumed that these items give a reasonable approximation to the 
major categories of budgetary outflows in urban African families. The options 
for answers were five, ranging in an ordinal scale from "husband alone" through 
"husband and wife equally" to "wife alone," as shown in Table 6. Any movement 
away from the "husband only" category can be interpreted as an increase in 
wife's status and responsibility. Alternatively, one may collapse the four 
categories at each of the autonomous ends of the scale, and look simply at the 
jointness/separateness dimension. 
In the sample as a whole, husbands tended to be responsible for the larger 
number of expenditures; that is, no strong pattern of either wifely autonomy or 
joint financial responsibility emerged. However, some patterns of spousal 
autonomy were apparent in different areas. Wives tended to be responsible for 
the wages of the maid or housegirl, while the husband tended to be responsible 
for the rent or mortgage, for school fees for the children, for large furniture 
items, for his own clothing, and for a car if there was one. Food, and clothing for 
children tended to be shared. 
Such patterns seem to be very clear in some families, not so marked in 
others. It is my impression that perhaps half of the couples seemed to keep no 
precise account of who contributed how much, and had no clear system of 
budgeting. In response to a question as to whether she kept her own earning 
separate or put them into a common household fund, 56 percent of the women 
said they kept them separately, 44 percent said jointly. But, in response to the 
question "Who decides what is done with the money you contribute?", only 22 
percent of the women reported that they did; 66 percent said both husband and 
wife would decide, and 12 percent said the husband would. Only 29 percent of the 
men in Buru Buru 2, and 13 percent in Buru Buru 1 and Umoja, maintained joint 
bank accounts with their wives. The majority had individual accounts. 
When we examine the differences in division of financial responsibility 
between the different estates, the most marked finding is a definite trend toward 
the increase in women's role, and toward "equal" financial arrangements, as 
income and women's employment rise (Table 6). Most probably, those giving the 
"equal" response did not mean that they actually contributed equal amounts of 
money, but that they defined the situation as one of equality. The proper label 
for this response should probably be "joint" rather than "equal." 
The Index of Financial Arrangements is the average of aggregated 
percentages, and thus assumes that the listed expenditures do represent a 
reasonable abstraction from the household budget. Significantly, the Index for 
the "equally" or "joint" response shows a definite relationship to estate, rising 
from 19.6 in Umoja, to 33.2 in Buru Buru 1, and to 37.8 in Buru Buru 2. In Umoja, 
one of the separateness extremes, "Husband Alone," has a higher index than does 
the "joint" category, whereas in Buru Buru 1 and 2 it does not exceed the "joint" 
category. Overall, the husband's dominant role declines (from an index of 72 to 50 
to 46), while the wife's increases somewhat in most areas, except for school fees, 
rents/mortgages, and purchase of a car and petrol (not shown). The most marked 
trend, however, is the increase in joint arrangements rather than wife-dominant 
ones. This parallels the trend toward joint decision-making discussed below. 
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Table 6 
DIVISION OF FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (Percentages) 
-- .• 0 ~l rl! 0 !l, .. .. 'o .. d M ·~ i d d ~ e 0 -~ • .~ .• .• :E • ] -;, ~ "' ~ .o ,0 i ~ 0 d 0 ~ ] ·~ -ll M 0 :g • 0 ~ 0 0 u ill 0 :l= ill u "' ~ -"' Total Sam12Ie 
Husband Only 25.7 24.6 27.5 43.3 18.9 42.4 41.7 51.9 34.5 
Husband Mostly 14.9 13.4 15.6 34.9 16.0 22.9 26.7 28.8 21.7 
Husband and 
Wife Equally 35.1 45.9 28.6 18.8 23.4 24.7 24.6 13.9 26.9 
Wife Mostly 20.1 12.3 20.6 1.9 32.0 6.5 4.2 3.6 12.6 
Wife Only 4.2 3.7 7.7 I.I 9.7 3.5 2.8 1.8 4.3 
100.0 99.9 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Umoja 
Husband Only 
or Mostly 60.2 60.0 63.0 84.0 53.2 83.7 82.6 84.9 71.5 
Husband and 
Wife Equally 24.1 34.7 25.0 15.0 17.0 11.6 16.5 13.2 19.6 
Wife Only 
or Mostly 15.7 5.3 12.0 1.0 29.8 4.7 0.9 1.9 8.9 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Buru Buru 1 
Husband Only 
or Mostly 23.2 26.5 33.3 77.6 28.3 65.2 642 84.3 50.3 
Husband and 
Wife Equally 55.1 57.4 31.9 20.9 24.5 30.4 34.3 11.4 33.2 
Wife Only 
or Mostly 21.7 16.2 34.8 1.5 47.2 4.3 1.5 4.3 16.4 
100.0 100.1 100.0 100.0 100.0 99.9 100.0 100.0 99.9 
Buru Buru 2 
Husband Only 
or Mostly 25.0 17.1 25.7 68.9 31.1 62.5 56.6 80.0 45.9 
Husband and 
Wife Equally 46.1 67.1 37.8 27.0 29.5 35.7 39.5 20.0 37.8 
Wife Only 
or Mostly 28.9 15.7 36.5 4.1 39.3 1.8 3.9 0.0 16.3 
100.0 99.9 100.0 100.0 99.9 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
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This picture of financial arrangements contrasts greatly with that found 
by Barbara Lewis (1977:180-181) in a large survey of over 800 women of all socio-
economic levels in Abidjan, Ivory Coast. She found that the majority of working 
wives (73 percent) fell into the category of maximal budgetary autonomy vis-a-vis 
their husband. Only 8 percent integrated their budgets with those of their 
husbands, and while these were in the higher-status occupations, they constituted 
only 17 percent of all wives in those occupations. Lewis also argues that the 
separation of earnings prevalent in Ivoirian marriages means that the wife both 
maximizes her decision-making leverage within the marriage, and increases her 
social networks outside the conjugal unit. Women's earning power does not, 
however, provide an alternative to marriage among any income group. Increased 
earnings potentially provide the same benefits to Kenyan middle-class women, 
but they appear to be less able to institutionalize independent control over these 
earnings, given the prevalance here of "joint" financial arrangements. 
Division of Labor 
The content of household labor is defined by the prevailing economic 
context and the domestic unit's relationship to it. It has changed enormously as 
between African peasant families and urban middle-income groups. In our 
sample, work within the family by either the husband or wife was subject to 
severe time constraints in that both had to be at their jobs for most of the day 
five days a week, and over half a day on Saturday. However, domestic work has 
not decreased as much as one might think for these families, compared to their 
rural counterparts. High cash incomes have made possible a materially different 
life style, and high-status possessions such as cars, furniture and wardrobes of 
clothing now have to be maintained - mopped, dusted, washed, ironed, polished, 
and repaired - and also protected. Higher incomes have also made possible the 
adoption of new technologies for domestic work; many of the families in the 
sample had such amenities as fridges, gas stoves, and running water. I would 
argue, however, that most of these devices do not actually save time or labor, 
they merely raise the standards of domestic life - cleanliness levels, food variety, 
and so forth - while necessitating their own forms of labor input. (To be more 
precise, any time or labor they save seems to be undercut by the rise in standards 
of living.) It is in the area of "housework" or home maintenance, where the 
greatest expansion of domestic work seems to have taken place. In the area of 
food procuring and preparation, however, things may be easier and less time-
consuming. The middle-class woman does not spend the long hours hauling water, 
making charcoal or pounding grain that a rural woman would. But on the other 
hand, considering shopping time, transport time, new varied diets, and the 
number of dishes and utensils that need washing up, the time spent at food 
preparation might not have contracted so much as is commonly thought. 
In one other major area of domestic work, child care, modern values have 
also increased the amount of time input considered necessary. The middle-class 
mother often feels she should set aside time specifically for child socialization, 
particularly to prepare children early for the highly competitive school system. 
But she has little time for such work; employment away from home means that 
productive work cannot be combined with child rearing, as it can in peasant 
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society; it must be done separately. Part of the solution, of course, is to have 
fewer children. A final factor in urban child rearing is that young children in a 
complicated house and neighborhood of strangers can no longer so safely be left 
in the care of older siblings or nearby kin. On the whole, many middle-income 
women seem to live with a sharp discrepancy between their newly-acquired 
ideals of child-rearing and the time they are able to give to it. 
The upshot of these pressures in the middle-income domestic unit is that a 
maid or housegirl is usually hired. In our sample, 79 percent of those in Buru 
Buru 2, 78 percent in Buru Buru 1, and 43 percent in Umoja had housegirls ( or an 
occasional houseboy). Typically, housegirls are poorer uneducated girls from the 
rural areas, but surprisingly only about a quarter of them were close relatives of 
their employers. Higher income families, in fact, were less likely to have 
housegirls who were kin. Housegirls work long hours, almost all day every day, 
for very little pay. They do basic child care during the day, house cleaning and 
clothes washing. They help with food preparation and child care in the evenings 
(Table 7). There are limits, however, to what housegirls can be expected to do. 
Husbands still prefer their wives to cook, and in accordance with traditional 
values their performance in this area is often very critically evaluated. Nor can 
housegirls be given jobs which require handling money (such as shopping), going 
far from the house (such as taking children to school), or dealing with modern 
appliances (making repairs). These areas where housegirls do not contribute are 
reflected in Table 7. 
From the wife's point of view, there are many problems with the 
housegirl system. The first problem is finding and retaining a housegirl, in a 
situation of fairly high turnover. It is normally the wife's responsibility to find 
one, and it may involve a trip to the rural area. If a housegirl leaves, the wife 
may have to lose a week or so of work finding another one, with the result that 
her employer will be annoyed and inconvenienced. The second problem is in the 
quality of work that can be exacted. With child care, for example, many parents 
are concerned that the housegirl, who spends so much time with the children, 
may teach them bad speaking habits, the wrong tribal language, or other bad 
habits or manners. Housegirls usually cannot provide the quality child care the 
parents consider necessary. Theft and unreliability are other problems. And, as 
mentioned, there are limits to the kind of work housegirls can be assigned. From 
the housegirls' point of view, of course, there are also many problems with the 
system. They often feel quite exploited, and have many complaints about their 
employers. 
Another solution to the child care problem, for those who can afford it, is 
the nursery school for children aged 3 to 6. In our sample, 37 percent of the 
families in Buru Buru 2, 33 percent in Buru Buru 1, and 14 percent in Umoja had 
one or more children in nursery school. Nearly all of those with children of the 
proper age in Buru Buru did send them to nursery school; there were more 
families in Umoja who said they could not afford it or could not get a place. The 
nursery school has the advantage that in addition to minding the children, it also 
begins educating them in the skills of modern life. But the clincher is that most 
nursery schools, though privately run, are informally linked to a primary school, 
and it is widely believed that a child cannot get into a good primary school 
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B. Work Contribution By Estate (Index) 














































gets stiffer and stiffer in both urban and rural Kenya, and the nursery school has 
become the first level in a steeply pyramidal system (Gakuru, 1977). 
The Index of Household Work Contribution (Table 7) shows that despite 
the help of a housegirl, it is still the wife who is the primary performer of 
household work. The wife is by far the most frequent person who prepares and 
serves meals, purchases food, does the washing, and takes care of the children in 
the evenings. The housegirl helps with all of these tasks, except shopping at 
which the husband helps, but the housegirl's work in terms of tasks is 
surprisingly limited. The husband's contribution to household work is by no 
means negligible according to these measures, since he is active in purchasing 
children's clothing, purchasing furniture items, in making small repairs around 
the house (although often a repair man or "fundi" must be called in), and in some 
cases (usually where he has a car) in taking children to and from school. 
As a measure of total house work contribution, the Index constructed 
from the sum of the ten listed tasks in Table 7 almost certainly understates both 
the wife's and the housegirl's total labor time, and overstates the husband's. The 
percentages shown are from the wife's answers to the question "In your family 
now, how are the household tasks usually done? Who would you say usually does 
the following ... (read list of tasks)." The Index is the average percentage for the 
ten tasks. It thus measures task inputs rather than time inputs, as well as 
assuming that the ten tasks represent a good approximation to the sum of 
household work, and that each should weigh equally in the summation. The tasks 
in which the husband is most active are not the daily, repetitive tasks of meal 
preparation, washing, cleaning and child care, but rather the less frequently 
performed (although no less essential) tasks of purchasing clothing and large· 
household items, and making repairs. If we consider only the most time-
consuming and house-bound tasks, it is clear that the wife does the bulk of the 
work. 
According to our results, children's work contribution in urban. working 
and middle-class families is not very great. Even a specific probe on the 
questionnaire as to the role of children failed to elicit a greater response here. 
Male and female children are helpful in taking themselves and other children to 
school, and female children help with cleaning, child care, repairs and purchases. 
But they do not usually take the main responsibility for any listed task, except 
perhaps getting themselves to school. This contrasts greatly with the situation in 
the rural areas (Kayongo-Male and Walji, 1978). The low level of child 
participation is partly explained by the increasing complexity of household tasks 
but even more by the competing demands of the school system. It may also be 
that the concept of childhood as an age of exemption from work and freedom 
from responsibility, associated with rise of the middle class in the West, is 
emerging in Kenya as well. 
Finally, the other relatives staying in the household are not thought to be 
very helpful either. Sometimes they might make meals or wash clothes (perhaps 
their own), or clean, or mind the children, but like children they do not take 
primary responsibility for any task, perhaps because their stay is thought to be 
temporary. Several wives mentioned that having relatives staying with them 
meant extra household work. 
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The comparison of work contributions in the three estates indicates that 
as income levels and women's employment increase, the wife's household work 
load decreases somewhat (Table 7). Perhaps as a result of increased decision-
making leverage, the employed woman is more able to shift household work 
burdens on to others, especially the housegirl, and to a small extent the husband 
and female children. The work contributions of these later three categories rise 
somewhat, although not enough to eliminate the wife's dominant role. This is our 
main finding with regard to household division of labor. 
Family Decision-making 
The last variable to be examined in this paper is the distribution of 
decision-making power between husband and wife in the family. The findings are 
presented in Table 8, which is derived from the wife's answers to a series of 
questions of the hypothetical sort: 
a) "If you or your husband were to buy a car, how would you decide on that?" 
(read options) 
b) "If you or your husband were to buy a piece of land or invest in a business, 
who would usually decide on that?" (read options) 
c) "If you had to decide where to send the children to school, who usually decides 
on that?" (read options) 
d) "What about if you had to get a new housegirl, who would decide on that?" 
To get some approximation to overall family decision-making, the responses to 
these questions have been aggregated into a single Index of decision-making. 
Although these are major family decisions, they are, of course, not exhaustive of 
all family decisions; they may, for example, give undue weight to major as 
opposed to everyday kinds of decisions. 
Table 8 shows that in all four of these areas, and as a whole, the husband's 
decision-making role declines and the wife's increases as average family income 
and wife's employment (as represented by the differences between the· three 
estates) rise. The husband's sole role in these decision-making areas is greater in 
Umoja than it is in Buru Buru 1, and in Buru Buru 1 than in Buru Buru 2. A 
trend toward joint decision-making is not evident in the additive Index, because 
joint-ness does not increase with respect to decisions about the housegirl. 
However, this is the only sphere in which the increase in the wife's autonomous 
role outweighs any increase in joint decision-making; in the other three spheres 
joint decision-making also increases. This finding is similar to that with respect 
to division of financial responsibility. 
Clearly, we do not see here a strong trend toward the retention or 
emergence of separate or "autonomic" decision-making, a fact which offers a 
contrast to the Ghanaian civil servant families described by Christine Oppong 
(1974). Oppong's sample was small but intensively studied. It was, unfortunately, 
not drawn so as to be representative, but still, out of 61 cases, 19 (33 percent) could 
be classified as autonomic, 12 (21 percent) as husband-dominated, and 27 ( 46 
percent) as syncratic or joint on the decision-making scale (Oppong, Table 5.1, p. 
122; 3 cases apparently unclassifiable). This represents a much higher percentage 
of families with markedly separated decision-making, and a lower percentage of 
those with joint decision-making, than was the case in our sample. The option of 
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Table 8 
SPHERES OF FAMILY DECISION-MAKING (Percentages) 
" - -; "" ·51 - - " .s >< • " " 0 "" .c " .s " O<l " u = ; ~ 0 ; Cl ~ " .c • = • .c u 0 ~ t, u "" ...., "' u "' :i: 
Umoja 
Husband decides 3L3 25.9 16.2 7.5 20.2 
Decide together 67.9 73.1 78.1 47.2 66.6 
Wife decides 0.9 0.9 5.7 45.3 13.2 
100.1 99.9 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Buru Buru 1 
Husband decides 31.3 25.0 14.9. 3.0 18.5 
Decide together 68.8 75.0 79.1 35.8 64.7 
Wife decides 0.0 0.0 6.0 61.2 16.8 
100.1 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Buru Buru 2 
Husband decides 27.4 16.2 7.4 0.0 12.8 
Decide together 71.2 77.0 79.4 31.3 64.7 
Wife decides 1.4 6.8 13.2 68.7 22.5 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Total SamQle 
Husband decides 30.0 22.8 13.3 4.2 17.6 
Decide together 69.1 74.8 78.8 39.6 65.6 
Wife decides 0.8 2.4 7.9 56.2 16.8 
99.9 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
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"whoever will own or use it" on our questionnaire provided some indication of 
spousal autonomy, but the percentage of responses here was insignificantly low; 
if anything, the percentage seemed to decline as income rose. Oppong did find, 
however, that as the wife's resources in financial and educational terms rose, 
there was a trend toward overall jointness. This accords with our findings. 
The picture of decision-making given here also contrasts with that found 
in a Kikuyu rural area by Susan Abbott (1976). There, despite the persistence of 
strong traditional ideals specifying male dominance in almost all decision-making 
areas, in actuality many domains became female-dominant as a result of male 
out-migration for wage labor. When male household heads resided elsewhere, 
female decision-making increased, and the husband's authority was not delegated 
to other members of his family. The data presented in this paper do not permit 
precise comparisons with Abbott's work, but we can note that the high level of 
joint decision-making does not appear as strongly in the rural area. In addition, 
the wife's actual independent decision-making in economic decisions seems 
greater in rural families than in our sample. In the rural area women made all 
the decisions about subsistence crops and chickens, and owned and controlled the 
small amount of money from these endeavors. They also made day-to-day 
decisions on the major cash crops, such as when to spray the coffee, or how 
much milk to sell. Ownership and control of the income from these major crops 
was one of the few domains described as having become de facto "joint" rather 
than "husband-dominant." By contrast in our sample about half of the wives did 
not even keep a separate account of the money they earned, and the majority of 
women described as "joint" the decision as to what was done with this money. 
Conclusion 
Our data, then, do not yield a picture of growing independence of middle-
income wage-earning women from marriage and the family, or even of greater 
autonomy within the family, but rather one of movement from a "husband-
dominant" to a joint or "syncratic" decision-making and financial management 
pattern. Household work, on the other hand, remains largely the province of the 
wives, as do decisions about hiring a housegirl. Lewis observed for Ivoirian 
women that marriage remains a desirable asset for nearly all women, since within 
it they can (it is suggested) maintain a certain leverage and autonomy. Kenyan 
middle-income women, on the other hand, would appear to have more of the 
difficulties hypothesized by Audrey Smock (1977a; 1977b) in maintaining or 
achieving equal status within the family. Since the traditional decision-making 
arrangements in Kenya were not so clearly separated or autonomous as they 
were in some West African societies, perhaps the present urban decision-making 
relations may tentatively be described as progress. The same cannot be said, 
however, of the allocation of actual household work. 
18 
REFERENCES 
Abbott, Susan (1976). "Full-Time Farmers and Week-end Wives: An Analysis of 
Altering Conjugal Roles," Journal of Marriage and the Family 38: 1 (February). 
Aguiar, Neuma (1975). "Impact of Industrialization on Women's Work Roles in 
Northeast Brazil," Studies in Comparative International Development X, 2 
(Summer). 
Chaudhury, R. H. (1979). "Marriage, Urban Women, and the Labor Force: The 
Bangladesh Case" Signs, 5:1 
Feldman, R. (1981). Employment Problems of Rural Women in Kenya. Addis Ababa: 
ILO. 
Fernandez-Kelly, Maria Patricia (1983). For We Are Sold: I and My People. Albany, 
New York: SUNY Press. 
Gakuru, O.N. (1977). "Pre-Primary Education and Access to Educational 
Opportunities In Nairobi," Working Paper No. 321, I.D.S., University of 
Nairobi. 
Giele, Janet (1977). "Introduction: The Status of Women in Comparative 
Perspective," in J. Giele and Audrey Smock, eds., Women: Roles and Status in 
Eight Countries. New York: John Wiley and Sons. 
Goode, William J. (1964). World Revolution and Family Patterns. New York: The Free 
Press. 
International Labour Office (1981). Yearbook of Labour Statistics. Geneva: ILO. 
Kayongo-Male, Diane, and Parveen Walji (1978). "The Value of Children in Rural 
Areas: Parents' Perceptions and Actual Labor Contributions of Children in 
Selected Areas of Kenya," Department of Sociology, University of Nairobi 
Seminar Paper No. 27, November. 
Kenya, Republic of (1975). Statistical Abstract. Government Printing Office. 
Kung, Lydia (1976). "Factory Work and Women in Taiwan: Changes in Self-image 
and Status." Signs 2 (Autumn): 35-38. 
Lewis, Barbara C. (1977). "Economic Activity and Marriage among Ivoirian 
Urban Women," in A. Schlegel, ed., Sexual Stratification: A Cross-Cultural View. 
New York: Columbia University Press. 
Menezies, L. (1978). Buru Buru: A Social Survey. Mutiso Menezes International, 
Nairobi. 
Oppong, Christine (1974). Marriage Among A Matrilineal Elite: A Family Study of 
Ghanaian Senior Civil Servants. London: Cambridge University Press. 
Safa, Helen (1981). "Runaway Shops and Female Employment: The Search for 
Cheap Labor," Signs, 7:2 (Winter), 418-433. 
___ (forthcoming). "Women in Export Manufacturing: Proletarianization and 
Consciousness." 
Salaff, Janet W. (1981). Working Daughters of Hong Kong: Filial Piety Power in the 
Family. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
______ (1985). "Women, the Family and the States: Hong Kong, Taiwan, 
Singapore - Newly Industrialized Countries in Asia," in L. Iglitzin and R. 
Ross, eds., Women in the World. Santa Barbara, California: ABC-Clio Press. 
19 
______ and Aline K. Wong (forthcoming). State and Family in Singapore: 
Structuring an Industrial Society. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 
Scott, Joan, and Louise Tilly (1975). "Women's Work and the Family in 19th 
Century Europe," Comparative Studies in Society and History, 17:36-64. 
Smock, Audrey (1977a). "Ghana: From Autonomy to Subordination," in J. Giele 
and A Smock, eds., Women: Roles and Status in Eight Countries. New York: John 
Wiley. 
____ (1977b). "Women's Opportunities for Education and the Impact on Their 
Roles in Kenya," unpublished paper. 
Wong, Aline K. (1976). "Women in Singapore: A Report," Signs 2:1 (Autumn). 
___ and Yiu-Chung Ko (1984). "Women's Work and Family Life: The Case of 
Electronics Workers in Singapore," Working Paper No. 64, Michigan State 
University. 
